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 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for helping me make this clarification.1
 I think it is apposite to state that this paper does not claim to fully understand the intricacies and conflicts inherent2
in the idea and practice(s) of humanitarian assistance. My lack of ‘empirical’ experience ‘in the field’ could and
should be considered a shortcoming of the view I impart. However, my view comes primarily from a theoretical
point of view, one that is informed by ethical and moral preoccupations of postmodernist and postcolonial
approaches, and as such, tackles the concept and practice(s) of humanitarian assistance from a predominantly
philosophical point of view.
Introduction
The topic of this paper was inspired by Fiona Terry’s book Condemned to Repeat?, in which she illustrates
the moral paradoxes confronted by humanitarian agencies in their work. I intend to show how, in their
intention to ‘do no harm,’ humanitarian organizations ‘successfully’ avoid facing the consequences of their
own hubris.  By purporting that their work is and should be unambiguously apolitical, they embrace as their1
core principle the minimalist aim of saving lives. These agencies cause a prolongation of the suffering they
are trying to alleviate, as their material resources end up fueling local or regional conflicts.
I think it is most appropriate at this point, to mention that my purpose in exposing the inherent
dilemmas of humanitarian action is not to belittle its positive effects or the dedication of its workers. Indeed
it is most admirable that there are people whose calling is to alleviate suffering, and that deprive themselves
of all comfort and physical security so that they can be in the midst of situations, in which most of us would
not dare going.  But this does not make humanitarian action, indeed humanitarianism itself, immune to2
criticism. I believe that, for these very reasons, it is crucial to discuss how it is possible that an enterprise
geared towards saving lives ends up prolonging and even creating suffering and tragedy.
My aim is to go beyond a mere description of these tragic consequences, although practical examples
will be used to illustrate the argument of this paper. However, my primary goal is to expose the ethical and
moral underpinnings of this dilemma. The questions that I am trying to answer are: What are the moral
grounds on which the very concept of humanitarianism is founded? What is the prevalent mentality of aid
workers ‘in the field’? How is it possible that organizations that have as their self-professed aim to alleviate
suffering end up aggravating it? Are there any solutions to this dilemma?
Since unveiling the ethical and moral grounds of humanitarianism is the main focus of this paper,
I will attempt an exercise in the philosophy of ethics and morality, inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s
conceptualizations of selfhood and of the “tragic of action” in his Oneself as Another. In the first part of the
paper, I will discuss the ethical foundations of self and other, and their rearticulation as “self as another.”
Also, as Ricoeur points out, this idea of self as another needs to be framed by the dialectic between ethics
and morality. It is from this dialectic that the “tragic of action” emerges. The second part of the essay will
use this theoretical background to expose the hubris of humanitarianism, which purports that humanitarian
action is “a duty-based act that is right in itself” (Duffield, Macrae and Curtis 2001 :271). The second part
will also try to expose some of the representation practices authored by aid agencies, which establish a moral
hierarchy between a civilized and magnanimous ‘us’ and a savage and ungrateful ‘them.’ The third part
examines, through illustrative examples and theoretical reflections, how humanitarianism becomes a source
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 While Ricoeur frames the self/other relationship in such deeply sensitive and profound terms, it is important to3
remember that his view on the political identity of humans embraces Arendt’s postulation according to which “it is as
citizens that we become human.” Such an assumption is highly problematic as framing humanity within the discourse
of citizenship implies that the identity conferred by a state-centric discourse, which is that of citizen, overrides all
other identities present within one individual. As such, humans are truly humans only as ‘legitimate’ citizens, bound
by a territory and loyal to a state. While it is not the aim of this essay to focus on Ricoeur’s disappointing state-
centric view of political life and practices, I felt it was important that such view be signaled to the reader and be kept
in mind. However, his self/other reconceptualization is highly illuminating and provides an excellent background for
the discussion of the ethical and moral dilemmas of humanitarianism, and of humanitarian action.
of conflict precisely because of its self-expressed righteousness that leaves no room for self-reflection only
for reflex (Brauman 1998: 192). The last part looks at possible solutions for this dilemma, which involve a
deep scrutiny into humanitarianism’s moral foundations, a shift in its mentality, a reassertion of
humanitarianism as an inherently political concept/practice, and a diminishing of the ‘humanitarian space.’
Oneself as Another and the “Tragic of Action”
According to Ricoeur (1990), individual identity can be perceived as sameness or identity (from the Latin
idem) and selfhood or ipseity (from the Latin ipse). The former implies oneness, unity, that which does not
change in each of us, an “uninterrupted continuity,” whereas the latter signifies uniqueness, difference, that
which distinguishes one individual from the next. In this context, it can be stated that selfhood is that which
belongs to oneself and not to another. But every self is an other, as every individual is unique and
irreplaceable (225-6). While this pervasive difference separates us, it also unites us. Thus selfhood can be
seen as that which belongs to oneself as another.3
It is important to note that the dialectic of sameness and selfhood needs to be framed within ethical
and moral lines of action. Ricoeur makes an important distinction between ethics and morality. The former,
he argues, comes from an Aristotelian tradition and has a teleological perspective, possessing as ultimate goal
“the good life.” By contrast, the latter stems from a Kantian heritage and has a deontological perspective,
focusing on the obligation of the moral norm. Ethics and morality are two distinct realms, but they need to
be closely interrelated, which implies that ethics needs to be subjected to the test of the moral norm. Without
such test, the ethical is bound to give way to contradictions and conflicts, as each individual’s pursuit of the
“good life” will necessarily infringe on another’s similar pursuit. For such a pursuit to be undertaken in a
non-violent way, it needs to be made conditional on duty and obligation. This conditionality engenders
respect for another. The injunction to do no harm to another while obeying the universal ethical principle
of pursuing “the good life” is not something that can be easily accomplished. What is needed, is practical
wisdom or phronesis, as Aristotle names it, which implies the search for a “just behaviour” that is adapted
to the “singularity of the case,” and the need to strike a balance between happiness and suffering (Ricoeur
1990: 313).
The “tragic of action” arises when there is a division between the realms of ethics and morality,
between general ethical principles and the historicity of situations and of particular norms. The hubris of
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practical reason, as illustrated by Ricoeur, appears in the Greek tragedy of Antigone. Here, tragedy is
engendered by the division and conflict between the realms of the political, as embodied by Creon, the leader
of the polis who unflinchingly decrees that the body of the defeated enemy is not to receive the rites of burial,
and that of the civic/ethical, as personified by Antigone, the citizen distraught by the death of her brother,
considered the enemy of Thebes, and bound by the moral obligation of giving him a proper burial. The
conflict is between “the judging conscience” and “the acting person,” whereby moral principles are
confronted with the intricacy of life, and whereby the universalist claim needs to face the “contextualist
limitations of the rules of justice” (Ricoeur 1990: 289-90, 293). 
This theoretical discussion leads to the question: how should the self react when tragedy strikes,
wherein other selves are involved? The self needs to come to the other’s help. But such action involves a
relationship of inequality, as both the self and the other find themselves in unequal positions: one is the
donor, the other – the receiver. If the self perceives herself as another, then this inequality is transcended by
the recognition of the superior authority of the other, and by the awareness that the roles are reversible (Ibid.:
223, 225-6).
The Self-righteousness of Humanitarianism
In this section, I intend to expose a certain mentality on which humanitarianism is founded, namely that
“humanitarianism is a duty-based act that is right in itself” (Duffield, Macrae and Curtis 2001: 271). In
exposing this foundational perspective, with the help of the theoretical background provided by Ricoeur, my
aim is to problematize it and to reveal the tragic consequences that are inherent in it. Humanitarianism boasts
a moral legitimacy that is beyond questioning. Where does this sort of legitimacy come from? Who bestowed
this unambiguous aura on the forehead of humanitarianism?
Tomohisa Hattori (2003) traces the sources of the current imperative for foreign aid to a long
tradition of giving. The act of giving creates or reinforces a certain social relationship and an obligation to
reciprocate the gift. This expectation of reciprocation is a “balanced social relationship between equals”
(232-3). Forgoing the obligation to reciprocate creates an unequal relationship, whereby the donor situates
herself in the position of a generous, benevolent being that extends her grace and favours to an inherently
destitute and deprived other. It is precisely this sort of attitude that is so prevalent among humanitarian
actors, as it will be shown below. 
Thus the “institutionalization of giving,” whether referring to states donating to other less developed
states, to states and private actors donating to aid agencies, or to aid agencies donating to the ‘less fortunate,’
reinforces and legitimizes, on ethical grounds, a material status quo. Such a material hierarchy becomes
rewritten into a moral one (Ibid.: 237). It is strange that while acknowledging this attitude, Hattori glosses
over it in an attempt to prove that what matters here is that states are ethically motivated when engaging in
practices of giving. I think that the element that should be of deep concern is the “ethical boundary between
donor and recipient,” which she acknowledges, but without giving it the weight it deserves. This boundary
serves not only to reinforce “the material as a moral order of things,” but also to sell an image of
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“magnanimity” whereby an innate superior generosity and nobility is opposed to an inherent deprivation and
to an inferior way of life. 
Such a framing is deeply ridden with (neo)colonial assumptions and implications. In her book
Reading Humanitarian Intervention, Anne Orford (2003) unequivocally states that the practices of
humanitarian organizations reinscribe colonial narratives when dealing with tragedies occurring in
‘developing’ countries. The framework within which international institutions operate suggest a ‘narrative’
that creates a sense of a secure self, which she characterizes as white, masculine, powerful, rational, and
determined to discipline (158-180). On the other hand, the identities of the parties involved in wars and
conflicts are (re)‘written’ as insecure barbaric others non-white, female, powerless and helpless,
undisciplined and weak-willed (Ibid.).  This grand “narrative” is written in different “places”: the legal text
of international conventions and resolutions (see Orford 2003), in the representations disseminated by the
media (see Nyers 1999), and most importantly, in the practices of humanitarian intervention and assistance
(see Malkki 1996; Hyndman 2000).
I believe that the (re)inscription of this narrative constitutes one of the greatest dangers attached to
giving. Not only is our colonial past far from being assumed and problematized, but even more, it becomes
the sotto voce that prompts the posture of Western generosity. The colonial civilising mission is replaced by
a postcolonial moral imperative to give or to feed, the two become synonymous in the current order of things.
The ‘white man’s burden’ remains a reality, albeit a more stylized and subtle one (see Hyndman 2000). In
her book Managing Displacement, Jennifer Hyndman argues that the very ‘geography’ of the refugee camps
is a reinscription of an “us” and “them,” “inside” and “outside” colonial attitude. The way in which camps
are organized suggests a clear material and moral hierarchy between the staff and the refugees: the quarters
where the staff resides are usually located near the local police station, close to roads and enjoy much better
security measures than the area where refugees reside. On the other hand, the area of the camp that ‘houses’
refugees is vulnerable to attacks, theft, and there are many cases of rapes of refugee women due to the lack
of security within the camps (Hyndman 2000: 95-8). The spatialization of refugee camps reflects the
‘comfortable distance’ between refugees and staff, between a secure ‘us’, self-righteous and obliging, and
an insecure ‘them,’ whose undisciplined ways require a paradoxical mélange of distancing and monitoring.
It requires distancing as the ‘us’ enjoys much more comfortable and secure premises, and it requires
monitoring, as refugees are constantly watched so that they may not take more than their ratio of food and
supplies (Ibid.: 117-147).
As Brauman (1998) aptly remarks, “to do good is accompanied by a feeling of omnipotence,” “an
excessive and smug faith in the morality of humanitarian action” (192). Humanitarianism’s self-expressed
goal, as purported by International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) creed, is to save lives, all lives, and
feed and cure people, all people, without any regard to political consequences. Since humanitarian action
is and should be completely apolitical and neutral, why should aid workers be preoccupied with the
consequences of their actions, which are very much political? It is puzzling that such an attitude has been
embraced for decades, in spite of the disastrous consequences it provoked. How is it possible that in
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situations characterized by such deep political conflict and turmoil, in which the very idea and action of
assistance is a sort of intervention, we can comfortably believe that our actions will have no political
consequences, that our endeavours are protected by a vacuum of neutrality that seals all implications shut?
I think it is important to note that one of the main causes for the tragic consequences of humanitarian action
is specifically this divide between the political and the humanitarian/ethical, this unproblematic embrace of
neutrality and impartiality as flawless guidelines (see Brauman 1998; Brauman 2000; Warner 1999). The way
in which both realms (the political and the humanitarian/ethical) are currently framed is that while the
political is assigned a sphere that has as actors sovereign states, motivated by self-interest and constantly
engaged in a ruthless competition devoid of ethics and principles, the humanitarian sphere is one that is
‘exclusively’ involved with the ethical and with principled action; or to put it more bluntly, the humanitarian
sphere is given the role of cleaning up the mess that the political provokes in people’s lives and social
environments. 
I argue that the two spheres cannot be disconnected, that humanitarianism is an inherently political
concept and practice: to go into a territory that belongs to another country in order to provide aid is a political
action; to provide aid ‘indiscriminately’ in the middle of conflict and war has deep political consequences.
A question that arises is: are not war and tragedy the very conditions for the existence of humanitarianism?
And if these are its conditions, is not humanitarianism an inherently political concept and practice? There
seems to be two trends within humanitarianism with regards to the idea of the political and its relationship
to aid organizations. One trend, a ‘traditional’ approach to humanitarianism, stipulates that humanitarian
space is and should remain an apolitical space, dominated by impartiality and universality in the distribution
of aid, and by neutrality towards the conflict in question. The ‘classic’ example of ‘traditional’
humanitarianism is the ICRC, whose embrace of neutrality and impartiality, and whose refusal to
acknowledge the political consequences of its actions have raised numerous and harsh critiques against its
approach, as the example of the Bosnian conflict will reveal in the third part of this paper. ICRC’s practices
suggest an unproblematic embrace of the status quo, and reveal an uncritical acceptance of war and conflict.
 Another approach to humanitarianism is adopted by what is now called the “new humanitarianism”
(Fox 2001), as promoted by organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Such an approach
implies an acknowledgment of the fact that humanitarian aid and practices are deeply politicized and have
political ramifications. However, there is also an implicit nostalgia for the (re)creation of a humanitarian
space within which humanitarian assistance is “in response to a crisis that was not caused by the provider
of aid” (Terry 2002: 241). Such wishful thinking suggests that there are no connections between aid giver
and aid receiver, that aid can exist in some sort of political vacuum. As the examples of the conflicts from
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Ethiopia will show, not only there is no such thing as politically innocent aid, but in
many cases the development aid industry can provide a serious economic infrastructure for genocidal
governments and warring factions, by sustaining projects previous to conflicts, and then continuing to
provide aid long after conflict breaks out (see Terry 2002; Orford 2003).
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Humanitarianism as an approach to crises is characterized by two overarching elements: one is its
sense of emergency; the other is that of ‘victimization.’ With the first element, when tragedy strikes,
humanitarian agencies focus on the rush to save lives, by providing to the satisfaction of the ‘basic needs’
of those affected by crisis. What is lacking, however,  is a questioning of whom it is that they are feeding and
how their resources are being used. The other element, that of ‘victimization’, portrays people affected by
crises as helpless victims who can “do little or nothing to help themselves” (Anderson 1998: 139; see also
Hyndman 2000; Malkki 1996; Nyers 1999). In this light, humanitarianism as an ideology needs to be
scrutinized through the ethical and moral lenses offered by Ricoeur. 
If selfhood is perceived as involving such a deep enmeshment and intimate encounter between
sameness and alterity/otherness that the two cannot be separated, then the perception of self as another
should be the moral norm that guides every action. When examining the practices of representation, and the
interactions between aid workers and recipients of aid, it becomes more than clear that what happens is a
clear-cut separation between humanitarians and people struck by crises, between selfhood and otherness. The
self is not perceived as another, but rather as opposed to the other. This separation is founded on the premise
that their roles are fixed and immutable, that there is no sameness that can unite the two, and more
importantly, the superior authority of the other as regards one’s own life is not only unacknowledged, but
indeed altogether dismissed. An interesting example in support of such an accusation is the “Listening to the
Displaced” project initiated by Oxfam (see Rajaram 2002). The motivation that stirred this initiative was an
admirable one, namely that of “allowing others to speak for themselves,” seeking to “imbue humanitarian
and development projects with the opinions and experiences of refugees” (Rajaram 2002: 254). The project
involved interviewing large numbers of  displaced people in ‘the Wanni’ region of Sri Lanka, so that the
organization might have a better understanding of what their needs were and address those needs efficiently.
The problems identified by Prem Kumar Rajaram in his article “Humanitarianism and Representations of
the Refugee” pointed to the fact that the methodology of the project unproblematically reduced the identity
of the displaced “to fit the institutional frameworks and demands of Oxfam as a humanitarian agency” (Ibid.:
255). Thus the reports of the interviews reveal a narrative that establishes clear limits between the ‘I,’ which
is the ‘research facilitator,’ the ‘report writer,’ as an individual who enjoys a complex life, and the ‘we’, the
refugees as ‘disembodied quotations’ that are part of a collective and whose lives revolve around the
satisfaction of their basic needs (Ibid.: 261-2). As such, the project aimed not particularly at “listening to the
displaced,” having little to do with sharing the experiences of refugees and making their voices heard, but
at satisfying an institutional requirement for accuracy and efficiency.
Ricoeur mentions that when the other is besought by tragedy, true sympathy of the self towards the
other stems from the passage through purification (catharsis), terror or awe (phobos), and pity or compassion
(eleos). Going through purification and terror/awe are essential steps, whereby the self acknowledges the
shared burden of fragility (the human mortality inherent in every person), the necessary reversibility (‘me-
you’ is fraught with relativity, as the roles are reversible), the irreplaceability of the other, and the similitude
that binds the two (‘I cannot have esteem for myself without esteeming another as myself’) (Ricoeur 1990:
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225-6). What happens ‘in the field’ is only a manifestation of eleos (reified as pity), whereby the people
struck by tragedy are subdued to the “victim strategy” (Brauman 1998: 188), suggesting that they cannot help
themselves and have no authority over the means with which to administer their own lives.  Had such ethical
and moral prescriptions been heeded, perhaps Oxfam’s project would have taken a different turn, one that
would have implied an awareness of the complex individuality of the interviewed persons, their
uncontestable authority and subjectivity, and thus help could have been offered in a more meaningful way.
The inequality apparent in the relationship between aid workers and aid receivers leads to the
inability of the two to identify with each other, and causes the creation of a “new ethos” (Anderson 1998:
151). This ethos becomes constructed as the story of aid workers from the civilized side of the world who
have to outsmart, by superior and noble wisdom, the backward and child-like attitudes of the locals.
Hyndman (2000) gives a detailed account of monitoring and controlling practices of aid agencies that speak
of a paternalistic treatment of refugees and of the ‘need’ for their surveillance. In many camps humanitarian
organizations use headcounts, ‘census-taking exercises,’ whereby they try to obtain an accurate estimate of
the number of refugees so as to match the ratios of food and supplies with the population of refugees within
the camp (127). Such exercises are deeply resented and resisted by the refugees (Ibid.) who find them
offensive and humiliating. Moreover, refugees who actually take a stand and actively resist such practices
are treated as ‘disorderly’ and ‘undisciplined.’ Such a treatment establishes a division between ‘good
refugees’, who are submissive, quiet, and non-interfering with the work done by the staff of aid agencies, and
‘bad refugees’ who are ‘undisciplined,’ ‘create problems,’ and hinder the activities of aid workers. Such
ethos of ‘good refugees’ versus ‘bad refugees’ creates the space for acknowledging only a negative sense of
agency, whereby refugees who resist to offending practices are portrayed as the antinomy of the ideal of
refugeeness.4
It is important to note that this inequality not only leads to obvious ‘othering’ practices, but it creates
dependency of refugees on aid. This dependency transforms people afflicted by crises into persons whose
agency and authority are denied. Refugee camps are built far from the settlements of locals, making them
unable to resume their regular lives, and causing them to organize their lives around the routines of aid
distribution (Hyndman 2000). Another corollary of this inequality, related to dependency, is the inherent
short-sightedness of humanitarianism whose expressed and only goal is to save lives. Mary B. Anderson
(1998) rhetorically asks: “You save my life today, but for what tomorrow?” What is the point of saving a life,
or better said of prolonging a life, if that person is going to be killed later not by hunger, but by a bullet?
What is the point of healing the wounded if such an exercise, as beneficial and well-intended as it might be,
merely saves them for future suffering and fails to address the very sources of conflict?
When Aristotle, through Ricoeur’s reinterpretation, talked about the final aim of ethics being the
“good life,” what exactly did he mean by “good life?” Did he mean that to reach the “good life” it is
sufficient to be fed, sheltered and healed? Is the ‘good life’ only about satisfying “basic needs,” or is it about
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living and acting in harmony with the other, acknowledging that every self is an other, and by this achieving
true sympathy and community of living? My concern is that humanitarianism’s double self-framing as “a
duty based act that is right in itself” and as having the sole purpose of saving lives (by feeding and healing)
creates an ethos that is most arrogant and narrow in its vision, to say the least. Not only is this ethos a
reiteration of colonial attitudes for the reasons exposed above (see Hyndman 2000; Kent 2003; Nyers 1999),
but it is a reinforcement of a material status quo, whereby a moral hierarchy between the ‘First’ and the
‘Third’ worlds becomes reified (see Hattori 2003).
The humanitarian dilemma and its sense of tragedy lie also in its inability to match material resources
with good intentions (Rieff 1997). According to Sarah Kenyon Lischer (2003), humanitarian agencies have
two main assets: their “moral clout” and their material means (102). But the question is: how can these two
be reconciled without causing further suffering? Besides the arrogant in-built mentality within the concept
of humanitarianism, as discussed above, there is another element that leads to the tragic consequence of
prolonging and fueling conflict: humanitarianism has become a business (Brauman 1999; Barber 1997; Rieff
1997; Rieff 1998; Terry 2002). This can be attributed to the rise of neoliberalism as the dominant ideology
of economic globalization. Not only is there a self-conceited attitude of humanitarianism as a
concept/practice “good in itself,” but there is a lot of competition between aid organizations for visibility and
funds. Such competitive spirit needs to be placed within the larger context of the liberalization of the global
economy. When receiving loans from international institutions, developing countries face enormous
pressures to liberalize their economies. As such the presence of development agencies in these countries is
an extremely important element in understanding the dynamics between aid and war economy (see Terry
2002; Orford 2003). 
In her book Condemned to Repeat?, Fiona Terry (2002) deals with the “paradoxes of humanitarian
action.” By embracing neutrality and impartiality as their guiding principles, aid agencies set up refugee
camps and “safety zones,” thereby providing refuge not only for displaced civilians, but also for combatants
or “refugee warriors,” and thus allowing the militarization of camps under the umbrella of “humanitarian
sanctuaries” (27). Another paradox engendered by the presence of humanitarian agencies is that an important
quantity of the material capabilities of aid agencies are diverted by warring factions for military purposes,
thus feeding the war economy in the area (Ibid.: 35-42). The mere presence of humanitarian agencies in zones
of conflict can confer legitimacy to “individuals, organizations, rebel movements, and governing regimes,”
particularly through their appeals for help through the media (Ibid.: 42). Such regimes exploit the presence
of aid organizations so as to create for themselves an aura of credibility before the international community.
By engaging in negotiations with rebel movements or governing regimes, aid agencies tacitly acknowledge
and reinforce the claim that either of the two has on the territory (Ibid.: 44). Another perverse effect of
humanitarian assistance is that camps can be and are used as instruments of population control by warring
factions. This means that aid becomes an instrument of coercing refugees into taking sides in a conflict, as
in many instances, such as in Rwanda, warring factions are sheltered by the camps and place enormous
pressures on the refugee population residing therein (Ibid.: 47-50). 
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Aid agencies are organizations that depend on external donations be it from states or from non-state
actors. It is indeed fascinating to observe how their self-proclaimed independence can be reconciled with
their almost complete dependence on funds coming mostly from national governments. I argue that it cannot
be reconciled, as donors’ funding is most of the time conditional on the fulfillment of certain requirements.
Aid agencies can decide that a certain crisis needs immediate action, but without the necessary funding their
movements and plans of action are painfully restricted. 
This situation leads to a very competitive approach towards crises, which implies that various
agencies are striving not only to advertise the utterly desolate and desperate nature of the crises, but also to
promote their own image and make themselves visible, so that they can be entitled to a share of the ‘market’
(Terry 2002). Thus when organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) withdrew themselves from the refugee camps in Zaire, in protest of the misuse of aid for
the purpose of militarization of camps, there were other organizations that were all too willing to replace
them. The withdrawal of the two agencies did not have the intended effect, namely to send a forceful signal
that the presence and activities of humanitarian agencies on the border between Rwanda and Zaire merely
fueled and worsened the suffering, instead of alleviating it.
Discussing the issue of the lack of funding which impedes on the activities of aid organizations
seems to exculpate them from their hubris. However, this is not necessarily a contradiction, as the
relationship between the lack of funding and the hubris of humanitarianism is intimately connected with the
division between the political and the ethical spheres, as discussed in the second part of the paper. As such,
if the political is the sphere devoid of principles and ethics, the sphere of ethics/humanitarian is by opposition
good beyond questioning, which creates the paradox of having a ‘smug faith’ in its own self-righteousness,
but at the same time being painfully dependent on the political sphere for the provision of its material
capabilities.5
In such a light, the humanitarian field is deemed to be an apolitical one. Naturally, such an idea
proves to be a mere illusion in the ‘real’ world. Moreover, humanitarian action is constantly used as a
surrogate for efficient political action, by framing the various crises that occur around the world as
‘humanitarian crises’ (see Hyndman 2000; Kenyon Lischer 2003; Väyrynen 1999; Warner 1999). It is not
surprising therefore that instead of healing, humanitarian action proves many times to be hurtful, since it not
only fails to address the real causes of tragedies, but its action is merely a palliative, a band-aid on a gaping
wound. 
It would be unfair to suggest that the failure to properly tackle the real causes of tragedies lies with
the ‘humanitarian’ agencies alone. The blame, I believe, can be assigned mainly to various political actors
(whether states or international agencies) that have the ability and resources to address the roots of conflicts,
yet who fail to do so either out of a revolting disinterest that is prompted by ‘political’ calculations (such as
the lack of interest in the area of conflict, as the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia will show) or that rush too
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quickly to take sides and help restore the peace without weighing the situation and its causes properly (as
the case of the Bosnian conflict will show). To go even further, I would state that the source can be traced
back to a system in which sovereign entities compete ‘freely’ for survival, proud of their internal and external
sovereignty, and boastful of their congruence of state, nation and territory.  Also, as already mentioned6
repeatedly in the paper, another source would be the conceptualization of the political field as a field
completely divorced from ethics. Both sources find their origins in the realist tradition, which still very much
controls the framing of the field (see Warner 1999).
Humanitarian Action as a Source of Conflict
Rony Brauman (1998) stated that “humanitarian aid has been used as a tool of totalitarian propaganda
throughout the 20  century, from the aftermath of World War I to the genocide in Rwanda” (188). Whatth
prompted such blindness on part of humanitarian agencies? I argue that the answer is their hubris. The hubris
of humanitarianism, as discussed above, is that humanitarianism is inherently and unquestioningly something
good, and more dangerously, something above scrutiny and doubt. This “smug faith,” as Brauman put it,
prompts aid agencies to act and behave as if their mere presence is enough to alleviate suffering, and as if
their actions can carry only positive apolitical effects. This also leads to their unwillingness to reflect on their
past experiences and learn from their mistakes. For, if one is above good and evil, if one is protected by the
impenetrable clout of self-righteousness and neutrality, why should one muse on the consequences of one’s
actions?
As stated above, humanitarianism today serves to reinforce the status quo and a certain moral
hierarchy. The example of humanitarian action in Ethiopia during the 1980s serves to illustrate this point.
When, as a result of prolonged drought, famine struck in Ethiopia with devastating consequences on millions
of people, humanitarian agencies sprang in action only after a BBC documentary made public the desperate
situation (Brauman 1998). Although drought played an important role in the famine that struck Ethiopia,
Terry identifies two causes for the devastating situation that occurred between 1983 and 1985: one was the
counterinsurgency launched by the Ethiopian army against the attacks of Colonel Mengistu’s opponents, and
the other cause was the disastrous economic programs designed and implemented by Colonel Mengistu’s
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 Brauman states that for a long time NGOs did not understand what was happening, and failed to have any sort of7
reaction to the disastrous policies of forced population displacement implemented by Colonel Mengistu’s
government. It is only with reports coming from the press that the main aid donors started to express reservations
about the presence of foreign aid in Ethiopia and its contribution to the displacement practices of the Ethiopian
government. 
government (Terry 2002: 48). Famine was used as a weapon by the Ethiopian government, to deprive the
opposing factions of “a base of local support,” and to further its agricultural policies of “collectivization”
(Ibid.).  Rural populations from the north of the country were forcefully relocated in the south in horrible
conditions. The camps set up by humanitarian organizations with the purpose of alleviating hunger and
providing medical assistance to local populations became instruments whereby the Ethiopian government
carried out its relocation policies. The latter withheld aid from areas where opposing factions had control,
and used camps to attract local populations and then deport them in the south.  
Thus humanitarian aid was manipulated by the Mengistu regime to further its plans of forced
population displacement with the goal of creating “the first authentically communist African society”
(Brauman 1998: 184). The fact that within camps people were rounded up by government militias, families
torn apart and forced to relocate under threats of death and starvation, caused no reaction in the NGOs that
were present (Ibid.: 184-85).  Since such criminal practices were carried by government officials, according7
to governmental plans of action, this created an aura of legitimacy around them. Surely the Ethiopian
government would know better what is good for its citizens, even if the latter were unwilling and suffered
horrible consequences due to the former’s plans of social engineering.
What is most interesting is that NGOs were actually split over the rightfulness or criminality of the
Ethiopian government’s actions. NGOs such as Oxfam, War on Want, and World Vision approved of the
relocation policies, whereas organizations such as Save the Children Fund, Concern, Action Contre la Faim,
and MSF criticized it, but did not think they had a right to interfere (Ibid.: 185-6). Later on, only MSF had
the initiative and courage to protest publicly and was expelled from Ethiopia as a result. In retrospect, the
Ethiopian experience proves that humanitarian agencies are in their overwhelming majority not only unaware
of the political/social/ethical/moral implications of their work, but even worse they consider it none of their
business. Their self-proclaimed righteousness blinds them from seeing that many times, it is their mere
presence ‘in the field’ that legitimizes totalitarian regimes such as Mengistu’s, and allows them to manipulate
aid for purposes that have little or nothing to do with alleviating suffering. As Brauman (1998) has put it,
“mechanical obedience is nothing but unadvised adherence, a sacrifice of judgment, and hence a necessary
condition for the unthinkable” (192).
Ricoeur has implicitly warned of the dangers of hubris and of the origins of the “tragic of action.”
He states that general ethical principles must be subjected to the rigour of moral norms, so that the
performance of the former does not cause a conflict between the respect for another and the respect for the
law. When examining practical cases of humanitarian action, such as the Ethiopian one, it is important to
note that humanitarianism’s embrace of neutral, impartial, and universal ethical laws (Pasquier 2001) causes
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a conflict between the respect for such general principles and the respect for the persons afflicted by tragedy.
Since humanitarianism insists on abiding by its ethical principles, it is ultimately the people involved in
catastrophes that get to be sacrificed on the altar of its self-righteous ideology. Aristotle purports that, for
such conflict to be avoided, one needs to adopt phronesis (practical wisdom), which would allow him/her
to reconcile the generality of principles with the historicity and contextuality of the particular situation.
Unfortunately, such practical wisdom is sorely missing from the actions of humanitarian agencies. It is this
unilateralism of the current humanitarian ideology that becomes the source of tragic, as it can be seen below
from the humanitarian experience in Bosnia.  
One of the reasons for the gross political inefficiency in the Bosnian conflict was its initial framing
(see Kent 2003). The manner in which a conflict is framed influences greatly the policies that are to be
adopted and implemented. In the case of Bosnia, the genocide planned and executed by the Serbian
government was for a long time framed as ‘inter-ethnic conflict’ or ‘ethnic cleansing,’ offering the image of
a conflict that had its roots in a Balkanic tribal mentality which had resurfaced after the collapse of
communism. Such a portrayal served to reinforce a divide between an ‘international community’ viewed as
the promoter of human rights, democracy, and progressive economic policies, and a region convulsed by war
precisely because such values were lacking (Orford 2003: 87-96). It has been repeatedly stated that the
atrocities committed during this war were due to local factors. Within this frame, the international
community placed itself in the position of ‘knights in white armour’ that had to intervene and pacify the
warring parties. 
Anne Orford places the Bosnian conflict within a larger context of economic policies of liberalization
initiated by the Yugoslavian government in the late 1970s under the pressure of international institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund. The latter’s programs of structural adjustment and ‘shock therapy’
played a significant part in creating a ‘sense of insecurity,’ ‘social instability,’ and contributed to the
destruction of the instruments for the protection of minority rights within a socialist state (Ibid.: 93-4). This
climate of social, political and economic instability provided the perfect milieu within which far-right
nationalist movements enjoyed legitimacy and seemed to offer a much needed sense of “community and
identity” (Ibid.: 94-5). Anne Orford’s contextualizing of the Bosnian conflict suggests that while the
genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia were perpetrated by locals, the causes of the conflict do not lie in the local
alone, but need to be rearticulated within a broader frame of economic policies of liberalization promoted
by international institutions. Also, Orford states that framing the Bosnian conflict in terms of local causes
obscures the manner in which a deep division is created between ‘outside’ and ‘inside,’ between a civilized,
secure self and a barbaric, insecure other, which needs to be pacified and disciplined, between a secure and
clearly defined Western space, and an insecure and conflict-ridden non-Western space.  
After the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, Slovenia and Croatia (until then
part of the Yugoslav federation) announced their independence in 1990. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina felt
threatened by its unequal relationship to Serbia, which was a bigger state and enjoyed greater power. The
federal army and the Serbian militias, at the order of Milosevic’s government, occupied a third of Croatian
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 Two sources were used for the briefly sketched background of the Bosnian conflict: Alan Folgequist, “The8
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territory and engaged in practices of ethnic cleansing. While the Bosnian government tried to maintain its
neutrality for a while, such a neutral stance became impossible as Bosnian territory was used as a base by
the Serbian government against Croatian forces. Moreover, Bosnia itself was convulsed by conflicting
loyalties between Bosnians and Croatians who favoured separation from the federation on the one side, and
Serbs who favoured the preservation of the Yugoslav federation on the other side. Thus between 1991 and
1995 the systematic practices of ethnic cleansing were primarily carried out by Serbian forces against
Croatians, Bosnian Muslims, and other minorities, such as Hungarians.8
The presence of humanitarian agencies in Bosnia was articulated within a frame of “moral
equalisation,” whereby both parties (Serbian and Bosnian) were equally to blame and both parties committed
atrocities (Kent 2003). The self-professed role of humanitarian agencies was that of alleviating suffering on
both sides, and their self-professed attitude was that of neutrality. In such a context, it seems mind-boggling
that officials from prestigious humanitarian agencies would witness practices of genocide, or discover
concentration camps, and yet refuse to make a statement on such horrendous acts. Unfortunately, this is
exactly what happened. The genocide began in Eastern Bosnia, which was the region closest to Serbia. One
of the most horrific massacres of Bosnian civilians by Serbian forces happened at Zvornik. A United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official was a witness to the massacre of Zvornik, yet for a long
time refused to make it public (Ibid.). Although 750 Bosnians were forcefully taken from Zvornik and killed
in a nearby village, the official press reports mentioned the killing of 10-15 civilians (Ibid.: 12). Apparently
a senior UNHCR official seems to have ‘significantly downgraded the information’ regarding the number
of slaughtered civilians in Zvornik, since a clear disclosure of such information would have jeopardized
UNHCR’s mission in Bosnia and its relationship to the Serbian government (Ibid.: 12). 
Another example is the ICRC’s discovery of concentration camps operated by Serbs at Manjaca, and
its refusal to acknowledge it (Ibid.). According to Michael Ignatieff, the ICRC officials debated for two
weeks whether to go public with the information or not. To speak out publicly would have endangered their
ability to ‘help the victims,’ to be silent on the matter would have made the organization accomplice to
genocide (Ignatieff quoted in Kent 2003: 16). The information was eventually reported in the press, but since
none of the sources used for the release of this information was the ICRC, it was clear that the ICRC did not
take on the responsibility of confirming the information (Kent 2003: 16). 
As it can be seen from the two examples presented above, ICRC justified its silence by pointing to
the fact that going public would have caused the agency to jeopardize its impartiality and neutrality, and
would have made it impossible for aid agencies to operate in Bosnia. It is hard to imagine that keeping silent
on such events can be justified by any means. How can one witness the massacre of hundreds of men, women
and children and keep silent for fear of jeopardizing one’s neutrality? I think this is a classic example of
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humanitarianism’s lack of phronesis, its championing of general ethics at all costs, even at the cost of
thousands of lives. Practical wisdom would have required the two agencies to speak up, nay to cry out loud,
against the witnessed horrors, so that firm and prompt political action would be taken. Instead, the two
agencies kept quiet for a while, and even when they decided to speak about it, the frame they employed was
that of ‘moral equalisation.’ This frame completely occluded the fact that the main perpetrator of genocide
and atrocities was the Serbian government, and that the Bosnian side, while culpable of its own crimes, was
reacting in its own way to the genocidal logic of Serbian authorities (see Kent 2003). 
The tragic consequences of humanitarian action stem also from a lack of responsibility. I argue that
humanitarianism is founded on a lack of responsibility and on a dismissal of agency. By examining the
normative frame within which humanitarianism operates, what becomes painfully visible is its refusal to take
responsibility. Neutrality, universality, impartiality imply a lack of choice: humanitarian agencies do not take
sides, they are apolitical; aid is extended to everyone irrespective of the side they take; humanitarian actors
are not concerned about whether the “victims” are guilty or not of any crimes, their job is to feed and shelter
everyone. It also ignores any sense of agency as it portrays the people that benefit from aid as ‘victims’ and
‘helpless.’ Even when humanitarianism does acknowledge agency in refugees it is a negative agency that is
being recognized, whereby refugees that resist to various ‘humanitarian’ practices are categorized as
‘undisciplined’ and ‘disorderly’ (as seen in the second part of this essay). 
Ricoeur (1990) talks about responsibility as a three-dimensional concept and practice. Responsibility
needs to be performed in a threefold temporality. The retrospective responsibility implies that we assume
the past since it belongs to us, even if the past is not entirely our doing (342). This implies that
humanitarianism needs to return to its foundations, explore and problematize them, and humanitarian
agencies need to assume their past experiences, with all their mistakes, failures and successes. Prospective
responsibility means assuming the future and understanding that consequences which occur are due to our
actions (Ibid.: 341). It requires us to be on guard and always in a posture of anticipation, whereas
retrospective responsibility prompts us to embrace a posture of continuous self-reflection. Both aspects are
sorely missing from the work of humanitarian agencies and from the ideological framework of
humanitarianism. I feel that humanitarian work is suspended in a present that is fraught with both a sense of
emergency and with a lack of perspective. The mission to react, save lives, feed, and shelter is so
overwhelming, that there is no time for anticipation or reflection. Time and place simply are; nothing else
matters. The present is an important temporal dimension, but when unaccompanied by a sense of recollection
and anticipation, it becomes frozen into a painfully short-sighted carpe diem that triggers unfortunate
consequences. 
The most recent example of the failure to take responsibility and acknowledge agency is Rwanda.
The genocide committed in 1994 by the Hutu-led government against the Tutsi minority led to counter-
insurgency by the Tutsi-led rebels who had been refugees for decades in Uganda. The latter successfully
defeated the Hutu-led government, forcing them into exile along with hundreds of thousands of Hutus who
were afraid of reprisals. The fleeing population and the Hutu militias took refuge on the border between Zaire
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 I should make clear that the notion of ‘bare life,’ as conceptualized by Arendt (1951) is a highly contested and9
debated term. Arendt claims that “it is as citizens that we become human.” Such affirmation implies that the state of
refugeeness equates to an “expulsion from humanity” (Walters 2002). However, I find this notion helpful as it
portrays a sense of taking away agency from refugees for the purpose of satisfying one’s sense of moral high ground
and beneficence/magnanimity. This taking away of agency need not be a conscious act, but it is subtle and yet so
discernable from the activities of humanitarian agencies. I do not deny that most aid workers are indeed very well-
and Rwanda. Instead of looking for a prompt political solution to what was most obviously a political crisis,
aid agencies were sent there as a surrogate for political action, to care for the refugees. 
When referring to Rwanda’s case, many analyses point to the lack of response on the part of the
international community in regard to the genocide committed by the Hutus against the Tutsis (Martin 1998;
Terry 2002; Orford 2003). According to Orford, the genocide and the ensuing plans for genocide were made
possible not only because of the lack of international response, but also due to a steady and inflexible
presence of development and humanitarian aid in Rwanda before and after the conflict. Quoting Peter Uvin,
she states that “there was no way that the government could [have] implement[ed] any policy, coherent or
not, without the assistance of the foreign aid community” (Uvin quoted in Orford 2003: 104). The
humanitarian aid agencies operated their camps in northern Zaire and extended their help to all refugees
making no distinctions between those that had committed genocide and those that were not involved.
From the very beginning, the Hutu génocidaires were mixed with the rest of the refugee population.
With the aid of the Zairian government, former Hutu militias manipulated aid for the purposes of militarizing
the camps, and of intimidating the refugees into not returning to Rwanda. Moreover, the aid became the fuel
of the Hutu militias’ activities, as they were planning for another genocide. The misuse of aid and the
militarization of the camps were so blatant, that MSF-France and the International Rescue Committee
decided to withdraw. This was a situation in which it was clear that aid was instrumental in the staging of
another genocide, and in furthering the suffering and misery of the refugees. In spite of such obviously
devastating consequences, many agencies decided to stay. Their justification was that, to put it bluntly in the
words of Fabrizio Hochchild, an UNHCR official, “even the guilty need[ed] to be fed” (quoted in Kenyon
Lischer 2003: 83). In other words, humanitarian agencies needed not to be concerned with who was guilty
of what, they were there to feed, shelter, and heal.
This sort of dangerous short-sightedness borders on sheer obsession with grandeur that deepens and
accentuates the moral hierarchy between a secure, democratic, and compassionate ‘First’ world and a savage
and ungrateful ‘Third’ world. Humanitarianism’s agenda is beyond good and evil, it has an inherent
righteousness and nobility that are beyond scrutiny, whereas the ‘victims’’ purpose of ‘good life’ can be
satisfied simply by meeting their basic necessities of food, water, and shelter. Refugee-ness becomes
constructed as an identity deprived of political agency, which exists somehow suspended in a ‘placelessness’
stripped of authority and subjectivity, and reduced to a ‘bare humanity’(see Agamben 1996; Pratt 2001;
Walters 2002). To be reduced to ‘bare life’ is to be suspended in a dreadful carpe diem in which one’s
highest wish and aspiration is to satisfy one’s hunger and thirst.9
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intended in their actions, but perhaps the roots of our colonial past run deeper than we think, framing and influencing
our actions. This is one of the instances when we need to assume our past, whether it is our doing or not. To frame
the issue in Jungian terms, this colonial legacy has become part of our collective consciousness and needs to be
exposed in all its subtle ramifications.
 In his article “Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics,” Appadurai deals with the10
example of a poor urban community in India that mobilized through grassroots efforts and conceived long-term plans
that aimed at improving its living conditions. Devising such plans also meant resisting the pressures from
governmental agencies of implementing ‘shock therapy’ treatment to the community, opting instead for long-term
planning that would meet ‘emergency with patience.’
 The notion of ‘humanitarian space’ has initiated numerous debates. There are authors (Terry 2002; Pasquier 2001;11
Fox 2001) that claim that humanitarian space needs to be created and preserved, as its functions are vital for saving
lives. There are others (Brauman 1998; Warner 1999) who take the standpoint that humanitarian space needs to be
diminished, in order to avoid the tragic consequence of aid becoming a source of prolonging agony. The debate is far
from over, especially with the emergence of what is now called the ‘new humanitarianism.’
Are there Solutions?
In an article in Foreign Affairs, Ben Barber (1997) recreates an extensive genealogy of the numerous cases
in the past in which aid was used to militarize camps and prolong conflicts; instead of feeding refugees, aid
was feeding war. The list is comprised of powerful examples of humanitarian failures such as: the Afghani
refugee camps on the Pakistani border in the 1980s, the Cambodian refugee camps on the Thai border
between 1978 and 1991, the Algerian refugee camps for nomadic Saharoui people in the 1970s and 1980s,
India’s Tamil refugee camps in the 1980s, the aid provided to refugees in Southern Sudan, and the crisis from
the Great Lakes region in Africa during the 1990s. Is humanitarianism “condemned to repeat” its mistakes
over and over again, as Fiona Terry wondered in her book?
There are certainly many voices that have stated that humanitarianism can reinvent itself by going
back to its founding principles and expose their inherent flaws (Warner 1999; Brauman 2000; Terry 2002).
For this to happen, the imperative of self-reflection becomes essential to the humanitarian enterprise (see
Brauman 1998). As stated earlier in this essay, humanitarianism needs to transcend its obsession with
immediacy and reflex, and “meet emergency with patience,” as Appadurai (2002) has brilliantly put it in one
of his articles in Public Culture.10
Another issue would be the refusal to act, an option embraced by several authors (see Brauman 1998;
Kenyon Lischer 2003; Terry 2002; Warner 1999). The idea is that, when it is clear that aid is used to fuel
conflict and war, and when it prolongs the suffering of the refugees, as it is used as blackmail and coercion
into submission, humanitarian agencies need to pull out of camps. Such an action would not only sever the
ties between aid and militarization, but it would also send a clear signal that what is needed is a political
solution. Aid should cease being used as a surrogate for political action. Daniel Warner does not speak
directly of the refusal to act, but rather of the necessity to diminish ‘humanitarian space’ and to make aid less
available.11
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 The question of taking agency is indeed another delicate and controversial issue. Can agency be taken, as in the12
now classic case of the Mexican Zapatistas, or does it need to be provided to the agent? I argue that agency needs to
be acknowledged, which implies that aid workers, by recognizing the superior authority of the refugees over their
own lives, need to be aware of the incontestable subjectivity of refugees.
Humanitarian agencies tend to obsess over “assessing needs” of refugees, meaning over the exact
quantity of food, shelters and medical supplies that are necessary in certain situations. Instead, they need to
start focusing on assessing capacities (Anderson 1998: 142-3). It is undesirable, indeed pernicious, to focus
on merely satisfying basic necessities, as it creates dependency. Instead, the authority and subjectivity of
refugee needs to acknowledged. It is not a question of allowing refugees to take agency, but rather of
acknowledging agency in the refugees.  12
During the past years, prompted by the disastrous consequences of humanitarian action in the crises
discussed by this essay, there has been a stronger call for the embrace of a ‘new humanitarianism.’ This new
form of humanitarian action should be characterized by politicization, whereby aid agencies are encouraged
to take political standpoints in a conflict, by a reorientation towards a human-rights based approach that
allows aid agencies to withhold or withdraw aid from parties that are in flagrant violation of human rights,
and by the shift from the minimalist aim of saving lives to development-oriented approaches (Fox 2001). This
new humanitarianism is far from being unproblematic. Some of the dangers identified with this new approach
are: the risk that aid agencies would become pawns for national governments to advance their foreign policy
agendas; people afflicted by crises would be dichotomized into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving victims’; and
the possibility that aid agencies would lose their ‘humanitarian space,’ making it impossible for them to
operate ‘in the field’ (see Fox 2001). 
It is important to remember that the perils identified above are to a greater or lesser extent already
present in the ‘traditional’ form of humanitarianism. Many agencies, UNHCR is only one example, are
already pawns in the foreign policy game of national governments simply because they depend on their
funding. What is needed is an increasing independence from national governments. Framing the second
danger as a dichotomy between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving victims’ glosses over the fact that the portrayal
of refugees is that of ‘helpless victims.’ If one maintains that aid needs to be given to everyone, irrespective
of their role in the conflict, then I would argue that we have not learned anything from these experiences. I
subscribe whole-heartedly to Warner’s position that ‘humanitarian space’ needs to be diminished, and that
aid needs to be made less available, not only with the intent of limiting the possibility of its being
manipulated by local warlords or murderous governments, but also for the purpose of not creating
dependency. Diminishing ‘humanitarian space’ would also allow refugees to build on their experience and
assert their authority.
As mentioned earlier in this essay, solutions for stronger political action seem to reinforce the status
quo of national practices of sovereignty by strengthening the position of the state regarding the resolution
of conflicts. Paradoxically, it is precisely this system of sovereign nation-states longing for a perfect match
between nation and territory that is the source of crises, and that makes possible the very idea of
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‘refugeeness.’ The state is, without a doubt, the epitome of ‘othering’ practices and exclusion, as its very
identity is forged against the existence of other similar entities, and by sequestering a way of life and making
it the ideal way, thus unambiguously excluding alternate ways of living (see Campbell 1992). Finding a
solution that transcends the reinforcement of this system is indeed the challenge that lies ahead of us.
Therefore, while searching for solutions to humanitarian dilemmas, we need to keep in mind that the idea
of humanitarianism and of ‘humanitarian’ crises is engendered both by practices of national sovereignty that
are inherently exclusionary, and by the selective willingness of such practices to engage into political crises,
which do not serve their self-centered interests. 
Conclusion
One of the fallacies of the traditional humanitarian approach is its belief, visible in its practices, that aid is
something neutral, value-free, and it needs to be ‘bestowed’ to everyone regardless of their role in the
conflict. Aid is not neutral, and is not value-free. It is very much politically charged and it makes a powerful
statement. The universal, neutral and impartial distribution of aid creates a moral hierarchy between aid
donors and aid receivers, whereby the former situate themselves in the position of civilized and noble
benefactors who impart their generous gifts to uncivilized war-mongering ‘others.’ I believe that this frame
is a transfer of colonial attitudes into postcolonial mentalities, a continuation of the leitmotif of the ‘white
man’s burden’ into humanitarianism as a concept and as a set of practices.
If one embraces the view that the self can only stay true to oneself by perceiving oneself as another,
if one understands that selfhood is not merely the assertion of ego, but the awareness that sameness and
difference are inscribed within each human being, making us all selves and others, then the relationship
between humanitarians and refugees needs to be based on the equality that Ricoeur envisioned. This equality
allows, in times of tragedy, for the opportunity to offer help to another while acknowledging its superior
authority over one’s own life. Such acknowledgement stems from an awareness that the roles are reversible,
that the people afflicted by crises are irreplaceable, and more importantly, that one cannot esteem oneself
without esteeming the other as oneself.
This ethics of responsibility needs to be subjected to the “sieve” of moral norms, so that the “alterity
of persons, inherent to the very idea of human plurality” should not clash violently with the “universality of
rules that uphold the idea of humanity” (Ricoeur 1990: 305). The universality of rules needs to be adapted
to the historicity and contextuality of every specific situation, so that the notion of respect should not split
into respect for the law versus respect for people. I argue that this split took place in the case of humanitarian
action. The experiences in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Bosnia, and Rwanda prove that the
depoliticized principles of universality, neutrality and impartiality have devastating consequences. For the
purpose of upholding these principles, people’s lives and protection were sacrificed. Instead of alleviating
suffering, humanitarian aid has fueled and prolonged conflict. In the case of humanitarian actions, universal
aid meant not some grand ideal according to which everyone was helped irrespective of where they came
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from, but allowing aid to be used for militarization, as coercion against refugees, and for the purpose of
conferring legitimacy to local warlords and murderous governments.
Solutions to such delicate and painful issues do not come easily. As discussed in the last section of
this essay, it is difficult to attempt reform or even radical change, without falling into new traps. What we
need are not flawless approaches, but solutions that are imbued with self-reflection and with the awareness
that any action has political ramifications, whether we intended it or not. Humanitarianism is an inherently
political concept and practice, its existence is made possible by the existence of the present system of
sovereign nation-states. Such a system, with its imposition of boundaries, is inherently prone to exclusions
and is the very source of the possibility of refugeeness. As Hannah Arendt (1951) aptly stated, “only with
a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion
from humanity altogether” (177). The challenge that lies ahead is to reinvent humanitarianism by
disembedding it from its state-centric framework, and situating it within a discourse of ethical responsibility
that acknowledges that the self cannot be separated from the other, that, as Levinas beautifully put it, “we
are all Others somewhere to someone” (cited in George 1995: 210). It is not easy, but it needs to be done,
the poetics of our inner self demands it.
I would like to thank Peter Nyers for the priceless assistance and patience with which he contributed to the
revision of this paper. 
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